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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
SNARR ADVERTISING, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
- vs. THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant.

Case No.
10808

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by Plaintiff by the filing
of two petitions before the State Tax Commission. The
first of these, filed February 3, 1965, petitioned for the
refund of Sales Tax erroneously and illegally collected.
(R. 1). The second, filed on May 21, 1965, petitioned for
a review and correction of a Tax Commission Audit concerning various aspects of Plaintiff's sales tax liability.
(R. 5). The two petitions were consolidated by stipulation
of the parties and the sole issue considered by the Commission and before this Court on certiorari was stipulated to
be as follows:
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"The sole issue to be resolved in this proceeding
is the proprietory of imposing sales tax upon the
receipts from advertising upon outdoor advertising
signs and bill boards." (R. 11)
DISPOSITION IN TAX COMMISSION
A hearing was held before the Commission on August
25, 1965, and the parties entered into a stipulation respecting certain factual and procedural matters on February 21,
1966. On October 25, 1966, the Commission issued its decision which sustained sales taxation of outdoor advertising receipts and thus denied Petitioner's claim for refund
and affirmed the deficiency assessment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of the decision of the
State Tax Commission as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pertinent facts are contained in a stipulation (R.
10-12) and in a transcript of hearing. (R. 13-110). There
has not been, in the previous proceedings in this matter,
any particular dispute with regard to the applicable facts.
Rather, as will appear in argument hereinafter, the differences have arisen from the interpretation, relevancy, and
legal significance of the undisputed facts. Since sales
taxation, as a legal proposition, must rest basically upon
the concise facts of the transaction involved, the following
facts concerning the nature of the plaintiff's business and
the transactions between plaintiff and its various customers are of significance:

i
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The Nature of the Plaintiff's Business.
Plaintiff is in the outdoor advertising business. Its
prime function is to place advertisements for its clients,
and its business is generally restricted to the medium of
outdoor advertising. (R. 63). This business is carried on
throughout the western states, and, within Utah, plaintiff
places only painted signs as opposed to posters. (R. 64).
The plaintiff is contacted by its clients in one of two
ways: the company wishing to advertise contacts the
plaintiff directly (R. 77), or, plaintiff is contacted by an
advertising agency, hired by the company wishing to advertise. (R. 77). Plaintiff employs from four to six salesmen within this area who perform the function of meeting
with the clients, discussing the nature of the advertising
desired, and the type of coverage required. (R. 65). After
the initial contacts, the advertiser is put in touch with the
plaintiff's art department to further refine the type of
advertising program to be employed. The art department,
after such consultation, compiles a written presentation
of the suggested advertising program. (R. 66). This is
reviewed by and discussed with the client, and is subject
to his approval. ( R. 66). After the client approves of
the program, he signs an "art work approval" form. (R.
200).
The next step is the selection and acquisition, if necessary, of real property locations whereon the advertising
structures will be placed. In some instances, plaintiff may
have under existing lease a location and sign structure
which are suitable for the clients needs. (R. 66). In others,
however, where no location and structure are available, the
petitioner must acquire a suitable location and place a
structure thereon. (R. 66).
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The real property required for these locations is leased
from the land owner. (R. 66). A standard lease agreement
used by plaintiff in this regard was admitted as an exhibit.
(R. 199). As may be observed from such lease, the term is
for a period of years, with a right of renewal in plaintiff.
The lease further provides that should the property involved loose its advertising value, the plaintiff has the right
to terminate the lease upon five days written notice. (R.
199, Paragraph 5).
After the location is selected, and acquired if necessary, the advertising client inspects the location and signifies his approval on a form admitted as an exhibit before
the Tax Commission. (R. 201). After the advertising presentation, the location and price have been agreed upon,
the final agreement between the advertising client and the
plaintiff is executed. The standard agreement used in this
regard was admitted as an exhibit in the proceedings below.
(R. 203). Paragraph 4 of the agreement provides that
plaintiff must maintain the displays in good condition, and
that the advertiser may change the display at any time
during the term of the agreement at its expense. Under
paragraph 5 of the agreement, plaintiff retains the right
to move the advertising display to different locations if
the original location looses advertising value. Moreover,
plaintiff is required to maintain such signs at its expense.
After the execution of the agreement, plaintiff proceeds with the painting of the advertising panel to be used,
the construction of the sign sructure (in the event that
there is not one available), and the placement of the
advertising panel on the structure. During the term of the
agreement thereafter, plaintiff maintains the displays and
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has the right and obligation to relocate the displays on
new locations and structures, in the event that the advertising value of the original structure is diminished, such
as by the re-routing of highways. (R. 203).
The Cost to the Advertiser.
Mr. Floyd Moon, Comptroller for the plaintiff, testified that the price for plaintiff's services depends upon "the
service the particular client desires" (R. 70), but the
criteria involved are the size of the advertisement, the
location where the display is to be placed, and the services
performed by the plaintiff. (R. 70). A representative
hypothetical situation was discussed by Mr. Moon: Assuming that a client wanted three signs in three locations,
with the agreement to run for a four year period, Mr. Moon
testified that a typical price would be $100.00 per month,
or $4,800.00 over the four year period. (R. 71). Such gross
income to plaintiff would cover all the costs associated with
the provision of the advertising services and placement of
the displays, and "hopefully" some profit would be left over
at the end. Mr. Moon testified the costs involved might
be broken down as follows:
Materials for sign construction -------------------------------- 5%
Labor for sign painting and construction---------------- 5%
Positioning of sign structure ------------------------------------ 5%
Total cost for material, labor, and positioning ________ 15%
The remaining 85 % of the costs is broken down into a
number of various factors including cost of the location
paid to the landowner, cost in acquiring the location, electrification and lighting of the structure, rotation of advertisements and structures from place to place in order
to keep the advertiser's message before the traveling public,
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maintenance of signs throughout the period of the agreement, sales services, and artistic services. (R. 72 thr. 77).
The typical sign structure itself, divorced from the various
services involved, costs on the average of $100.00. (R. 77).
This is not a significant factor in determination of the
ultimate price, since matters such as location, length of
service, creative services, re-location and maintenance are
more important. (R. 78).

The Relationship Between Plaintiff and its Clients.
At the hearing for the Tax Commission, a number of
plaintiff's customers testified concerning the relationship
between themselves and plaintiff in the placement of outdoor advertising. Typical of such testimony was that of
Mr. Glen E. Lee of Terminex Company, who is the officer
in charge of that company's advertising program. (R. 34).
With regard to the reason for advertising by the company,
Mr. Lee stated as follows:
"The purpose of it is to get our message, our
name, before the public."
In conjunction with this purpose, as an advertiser, Terrninex does not differentiate between the various advertising
media. In the words of Mr. Lee:
"So far as we are concerned, we see no difference between newspaper, radio, telephone pages or
outdoor advertising. Our purpose is to get our message before the public. We pay for getting this done
and in no wise have we been taxed in connection
with any of this." (R. 35)
Another witness, Joseph S. Francom, spoke from the
standpoint of the advertising agency. He stated that as an
advertising agency, his company is interested merely in

7
exposing his client's products to the public. He analyzed
the problem as follows:
"There is no difference as far as that is concerned. The television company bills their television
client and we lease or rent or buy from them a
certain number of spots or programs which we use.
The highways sign company builds a lot of highway signs. We don't own them. We have nothing to
do with them as far as ownership is concerned. All
we do is lease the privilege to use that sign for
three years or four years, whatever the period may
me. If the sign falls down or breaks up, that is
their problem, not the advertisers or the advertising
agency. All we do is lease the space." (R. 54).
Mr. Francom further stated:
"We have nothing to do with the property. We
have nothing to do with the structure itself." (R.
56).
And, finally, Mr. Francom noted that he did not feel, as
a client and contracting party of the Petitioner, that he
had any proprietory interest whatsoever in the Petitioner's
signs. (R. 61).
To the same effect was the testimony of Mr. E. S.
Hallem, owner of the E. S. Hallem Advertising Agency.
(R. 92). He testified that the only interest he has in
obtaining advertising services from any media is that the
media will best serve the needs of his clients. He said:
"We don't care whether it is outdoor billboards
or television commercials. We are only interested
in the results."
When asked whether or not he felt that the advertiser had
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any proprietory interest in the personal property involved
in billboard signs, he answered as folows:
"No, absolutely not, because when we buy a
sign or a space in the paper we don't care how the
thing is produced. We don't care what they do with
it. We enter into a contract with the paper for say ,
one issue. With the outdoor people for one year or
three years. At the end of this time when our con- i
tract is fulfilled and we have paid them, we don't
care what they do with the sign. The only thing
that we are interested in is that they maintain it
and as Mr. Moon has testified we watch them to see
that thev move the sign to the different locations. ·
This is their responsibility. We are not buying the '
sign or location. Absolutely not."
1

Mr. Hallem also stated emphatically that he has no interest
whatsoever in the cost of the sign structure involved. (R.
96). Ra th er, he noted:
"What I am interested in is the quality of the
work and how they perform it, how they reproduce
our art work. We don't care about their real estate
problems." (R. 96).
Of similar content was the testimon~~ of Mr. Francis
Anderson, responsibile for the advertising of Beneficial
Life Insurance Company. (R. 100). He stated that all he
was interested in is seeing that tlie product was exposed
to the public. He considered that as :t client he had no
propriety interest whatsoever in the tangible personal property involved in the sign structure. (R. 102). Nor did he
consider that the cost or value of the structm·e was relevant in determining the desirability of placing outdoor advertising. (R. 102). When asked if he assumed the possession of the structure itself, he stated: "Oh, no." (R. 102).
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Finally the Petitioner produced the testimony of Mr.
Wayne C. Evans, an account executive with David W. Evans
& Associates. He stated that there is only one advertising
media of which the customer takes possession. This is the
so-called "gimmick" such as fountain pens or balloons and
the like. (R. 105). With regard to all other media, including television, radio, newspaper, and outdoor billboards,
he stated that his clients "never" take possession of the
personal property or media involved ( R. 105). He also
noted that the only purpose for the use of any of their
media, including outdoor billboards, is "to communicate the
idea to the maximum number of people at the minimum
cost." And finally, with regard to possessory or proprietory interest of the outdoor signs, he stated as follows:
"We have nothing physically to do with structure or ownership matter. This is all handled by
the outdoor company. We contract with them to
reach a number of people through their locations and
signs." (R. 106).
The auditing division of the Tax Commission produced no testimony whatsoever to controvert the foregoing
eYidence as to the nature of the transactions of plaintiff
and its various advertising clients.

Decision of the Tax Commission.
After the hearing had been completed, and each of the
parties had submitted post-hearing memoranda, the Tax
Commission promulgated a decision under date of October
25, 1966. The "findings of fact" of such decision (R. 204)
consist primarily of a repetition of certain stipulated facts
contained in the stipulation by the parties. (R. 10). There
were no findings of facts made with regard to the critical
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issues in this case concerning possession, use, whether or
not the transaction involved a lease of tangible personal
property, etc. Rather, in the "conclusions of law" (R. 205),
the Commission simply went down the list and found as a
matter of law that:
(1) The painted billboards involved are "tangible per-

sonal property."

(2) The plaintiff's clients acquire "the right of con-

tinuous possession" of the painted billboards.
(3) Clients of plaintiff acquire "the right of continuous use" of the painted billboard.

( 4) Such transfers would be taxable if they were an
outright sale.
(5) In actuality, plaintiff's clients exercise a proprietory interest in and a control over the billboards.

(6) The transaction is taxable under §59-15-2 (g)
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
It should be noted that the so-called "conclusions of
law" are in actuality factual determinations of ultimate
facts in this matter. There were no findings of fact made
by the Commission to create a connective thread between
the testimony and the stipulation before the commission
to its ultimate decision. The Commission did not list its
reasons, its theories, or its interpretation or analysis of the
facts, but merely listed several ultimate legal conclusions.

A petition for re-hearing was filed by plaintiff on the
14th day of November, 1966, and was denied under date
of December 30, 1966.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROVIDING OF ADVERTISING SP ACE
ON A BILLBOARD IS NOT WITHIN THE LEGITIMATE AMBIT OF SALES TAXATION
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §59-152 (g).

Before analyzing, with particularity, the specific advertising arrangement between Plaintiff and its clients, it
would be well to review the basic legislative and administrative framework under which the Commission here seeks
to impose sales taxation.
The Commission does not claim in this proceeding
that Plaintiff actually "sells" anything to its customers,
but attempts to come within the language of Utah Code Annotated §59-15-2 (g) ( 1953):
"When right to continuous possession or use
of any article of tangible personal property is
granted under a lease or contract and such transfer
of possession would be taxable if an outright sale
were made, such lease or contract shall be considered
the sale of such article and the tax should be computed and paid by the vendor upon the rentals paid."
Statutes like this have been enacted in most states which
have a sales tax. The purpose of such legislation, originally,
was to plug a loophole which had developed whereby persons would evade the sales tax by disguising a sale in the
form of a "lease." Thus, for example, an automobile
might have been "leased" for a ten year period at a "rental"
which, in fact, constituted the sale price of the vehicle
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amortized over a long period of time. Such subterfuge
became sufficiently common that corrective legislation in
the form of statutes like §59-15-2 (g) was enacted to curb
the problem.
Thus, in interpreting such statutes, the Courts have
referred back to their original purpose and many have held
that only those "leases" which create the normal incidents
of a sale should be taxed. Bona fide rentals, not made with
an intent to evade sales tax, have been held not to be taxable. See, U-Drive-Ern Service Co. 1.:. State, 204 Ark. 501,
169 S.W.2d 584 (1943); Watson Industries v. Shaw, 235
N.C. 203, 69 S.E.2d 505 ( 1952).
The interpretation employed should depend ultimately
upon the applicable legislation or regulation which, in Utah,
leave little doubt as to the proper scope of taxation. The
statute itself requires that the lessee receive the c·ontinuous
possession or use of the property involved. Since it must
be assumed that the legislature intended something by the
use of this term, the logical conclusion is that it intended
to tax only those alleged "leases" which, because of their
continuous term, were tantamount to sales of the property
involved.
Any doubt about this has been resolved by the Tax
Commission's regulation S-32 which provides for the taxation of only those leases made "in lieu of outright sales."
Clearly, this phraseology would limit the tax to those situations where through a "lease," a buyer obtains virtually
all of rights of "possession" and "use" as would result from
an outright sale. The phrase is not novel to tax legislation
and it can only be assumed that the Commission was aware
of the effect of including such terminology. In Universal
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Engineering Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 256 P.2d
1059 (Cal. 1953), for example, the Court considered a statutory provision taxing leases made "in lieu of sales." In construing this language, the Court concluded that only those
leases during which the property was "substantially consumed" would be taxable. This, again, results in taxing only
"rentals" which permit the same general "possession" and
"use" as would an outright sale.
The only Utah case which has interpreted Utah Code
Annotated §59-15-2 (g) deals with just a transaction. In

Young Electric Sign Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 4

Utah 2d 242, 291 P.2d 900 (1955), the Court considered a
"lease" of signs wherein the "rental" was based upon the
cash sales price of the sign. Moreover the sign company
there wrote the sign off as an asset after the original term
of the lease. This transaction had all the earmarks of a
sale except for the passage of title, and the Court thus
held that the transaction was taxable. We submit that this
was a proper application of the tax to a lease made "in
lieu of an outright sale."
The instant case presents a factually different and
legally distinguisable transaction. The advertising agreement between Plaintiff and its customers has none of the
aspects of a sale. Indeed, it is not even a lease, but rather
an agreement whereby Plaintiff agrees to place the customer's message before the public. This is a wholly different
type of a transaction - a square peg, as it were, which
the Tax Commission has now tried to torture into the
round hole presented by §59-15-2 (g) and Regulation S-32.
Neither the essence nor any significant facet of the transaction involves the transfer of possession of tangible per-
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sonal property. The evidence on this point is plethoric
and undisputed:
There is no relationship between the value of the sign
structure and the cost to the advertiser. Clearly, one attribute of a lease or rental arrangement is that the cost
to the lessee will bear a direct relationship to the value of
the property involved - frequently fair rental value of
an article may be determined by determining a fair interest
rate of return on its actual value. In the instant case, however, the actual materials which go into a typical sign
structure cost only $100.00 - with labor in preparing the
sign and placement costs each also $100.00. The total
cost, including labor and placement would thus be $300.00,
yet the cost of having this space presented to the
public for four years would be $1,600.00. (See R. 70-72).
This demonstrates that the essence of the transaction clearly
is not the sign structure itself - for if it were, the rental
value for three years would be over five times the cost of
the sign itself. Nor is the sign "consumed" during the period of the agreement - the structure and panels are reusable up to a period of twenty years. (R. 90). Rather,
the evidence shows that the purpose and essence of this
agreement is that Plaintiff agrees to display the advertiser's product to a certain portion of the traveling public.
The undisputed evidence is that the advertisers are only
interested in getting their message before the public. (R.
34). Mr. Wayne Evans stated, for example:
"We contract with them (Plaintiff) to reach a
number of people through their location and sign."
(R. 106).
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The various advertising witnesses were in accord that they
had no interest whatsoever in the sign structure itself. (R.
35, 54, 56, 61, 92, 96, 102 & 106). Their purpose in dealing
with Plaintiff was stated to be the same as in their arrangements with other advertising media such as television,
radio, newspapers, etc. (R. 105, 92, 35).
The comparison to other media is persuasive. With
regard to television, newspapers, radio and billboards, the
purpose is the same - to reach a given segment of the
public. In each transaction there is personal property involved as a means to this desired end - video tape, printer's
mats, audio tape, copy, or a billboard structure. Such
property is not, however, the essence of the transaction
but merely an incidental step toward the desired results.
Just as a doctor must use his surgical tools to cure and
a lawyer must use law books, typewriters and paper to
properly serve his client, so must the various advertising
media, including Plaintiff, use personal property in serving
their customers' needs.
It will doubtless be argued by Defendant that the "pur-

pose" of an agreement is not relevant in determining its
taxability. Defendant has previously illustrated this argument by stating that two persons could not agree that a
horse is, in fact, a cow in order to evade a horse tax. We
would agree, but submit that the keystone to any such
analysis must be good faith. There has been no suggestion
that Plaintiff here seeks to evade taxation by spuriously
misnomering its transaction. To the contrary, the actual
facts of the arrangement support and bear out the proposition that is simply not a property transaction.
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Another most significant fact is that there is no transfer of possession of the billboard to the advertiser. This
will be amplified in a subsequent point, but the evidence,
in total, demonstrates unequivocally that the client receives
no significant possessory rights or interests. To the contrary, the Plaintiff retains the obligations to repair, maintain, re-paint and re-locate the sign structure. The client
merely receives a contractual right to have his message put
before the public.
Perhaps the clinching fact and best evidence is found
in the Tax Commission's own regulations and actions. The
Commission is, of course, the designated expert in interpretation and administration of this state's tax structure. In
Regulation S-65 the Commission has provided:
"Advertising space sold in newspapers, magazines, or othericise is not subject to tax. Likewise,
charges made by advertising agencies for preparing
and placing advertising media are charges for service and, therefore, are not taxable." (Emphasis
ours.)
The concluding paragraph of the Regulation provides:
"The tax does not apply with respect to art
work produced with the office of the advertiser or
the advertising agency for the purpose for visualization of any idea and the client's selection of the particular visualization he favors for use in his ·advertisements. The sale of materials to the advertiser or advertising agency for producing such art
work is subject to tax."
The evidence undisputedly shows that Plaintiff's clients are
purchasing "advertising space," just as would be done in a
magazine, on the back end of a city bus, or in a newspaper.

1
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That is the essence and totality of the agreement. Not only
the Regulation itself but the Commission's long-standing
interpretation thereof support this exception. Although
§59-15-2 (g) has been in existence for some 30 years. (See,
Laws of Utah 1935, ch. 91 §1), the first attempt by the
Commission to tax outdoor advertising receipts did not
occur until 1963. (R. 10). It logically follows that until
1963, the Commission itself had considered outdoor advertising receipts to be exempt under Regulation S-65. Now,
by some unknown ledgerdemain the Commission seeks to
reverse its long-standing interpretation, erase S-65 from
the books, and torture §59-15-2 (g) into application. The
Commission should not be allowed to thus disclaim its
own Regulation and interpretation, for as has been noted
by this Court:
"Long compliance with an administrative ruling lends strength to the proper presumption of the
regulation's validity." Utah Concrete Products
Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125
P.2d 408 (1942).
Nor should the Commission be permitted to limit the obvious and accepted effect of S-65 by applying the cryptic
doctrine of ejusdem generis to the terms "or otherwise."
Not only would this be inconsistent with the Commission's
past actions, but also it would contravene the equally applicable maxium that ambiguous tax measures should be
construed in favor of the taxpayer and strictly against the
taxing authority. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 9 Utah 2d 421, 347 P.2d 179 (1959).
A significant aspect of the Commission's action is that
it evokes a considerable discrimination aaginst advertisers

18
vis a vis other media with which the outdoor people com-

pete. The evidence demonstrates that outdoor advertising
is in direct competition with television, newspapers, and
magazines. The equilibrium which has existed for many
years when none of the media were taxed would be abruptly
altered by the imposition of tax against only outdoor advertising. In this regard, the Commission has stipulated
that it has not attempted to and does not now seek to
impose a tax upon the other media. (R. 11).

Such rank discrimination, such abrupt departure from
30 years of uninterrupted practice, and such a clear deviation from both the intent and wording of the applicable
legislation and regulation should not be permitted by this
Court.
POINT II
THE FINDING OF THE COMMISSION THAT
CLIENTS OF PETITIONER ARE GRANTED A
RIGHT TO CONTINUOUS POSSESSION AND
USE OF THE OUTDOOR SIGNS IS CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.
This matter is before this Court under the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated §59-15-14 (1953) which provides
that review by the Court may be "both upon the law and
the facts." Although the Court has accorded to the Tax
Commission some latitude with respect to the determination of factual issues (See Butler v. State Tax Commission,
14 Utah 2d 1, 367 P.2d 52 (1962)), such latitude does not
constitute a carte blanche by which the Commission may
act in disregard of material facts or draw unwarranted
conclusions from the facts before it. In all events, the Com-
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mission is bound by the applicable law and it may not make
findings of fact which effectually alter such legislative
framework. See Western Leather and Finding Company
v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526 (1935),
where this Court noted that the power vested in the Tax
Commission "does not vest in the Commission any discretion whatsoever in the matter of requiring a payment of a
sales tax by anyone other than such as are designated in
the act."
Even assuming arguendo that the instant transaction
were within the sphere and intent of §59-15-2 (g), which
we submit it is demonstrably not, the Commission has
erred in making certain factual findings, critical to the
question of taxation. The foremost of these is the Commission's finding concerning possession herein. As has
been noted, the statute prescribes the following criteria for
taxation:
"When the right to continuous possession or
use of any article of tangible personal property is
granted under a lease or contract and such trans! er
of possession would be taxable if an outright sale
were made, such lease or contract shall be considered the sale of such article and the tax shall
be computed and paid by the vendor or lessor on
the rentals paid."
The Commission, itself, in Regulation S-32, has amplified
the need for finding of possession as follows:
"Tax on receipts of leases and rentals applies
when the lessee has the right to use and operate the
tangible personal property."
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Thus, possession is the sine qua non of taxation under §5915-2 (g).
With regard to such key factors, the Commission made
the following conclusions:
(2) "Clients of petitioner acquire under provisions of the contracts and the agreements entered
into with petitioner the right of continuous possession of the painted billboard involved.
(3) "Clients of petitioner acquire under the
provisions of the contracts and agreements entered
into with petitioner the right of continuous use of
the painted billboard involved.
( 5) "In the actual operation of the contracts
and agreements involved, the clients of the petitioner, Snarr Advertising, Inc., exercised a proprietary
interest in and control over the painted billboards
in question." (R. 206). (Emphasis ours.)
It will be noted that these so called "conclusions of law"
are essentially findings of utimate facts. It is significant
that the decision of the Commission does not contain its
reasons, its analysis, or its discussion of the transaction
involved. Rather, the "conclusions" simply parrot the statutory language in blunt conclusions, wholly unsupported
by and unconnected to the evidence.

The facts in this matter, largely undisputed, clearly
illustrate that any connection between the evidence and
the Commission's findings as quoted above is purely coincidental. Without exception, the witnesses testified that
as clients of plaintiff they had nothing whatsoever to do
with the actual sign structure itself. They do not maintain the structure, exercise control over it, move it, paint
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it, alter it, or deal with it in any way. Significantly, the
advertising clients have no interest whatsoever in even
the real property upon which the sign structures are located. To the contrary, such property is leased directly to
Plaintiff by the land owner, and in such lease Plaintiff is
given the sole right to enter upon such property. (R. 199).
Therefore, the advertising clients cannot even gain entry
to the sign structure without committing a trespass as
against both Plaintiff and the landowner.
On the other hand, Plaintiff, itself, retains the control over the sign structure. Plaintiff has the obligation
to maintain the signs, re-paint them, repair them, move
them in the event that the original location becomes undesirable for advertising purposes, and Plaintiff maintains
the sole right to go upon the real property where such signs
are located.
The Commission did not specify what rights of possession were granted to the advertisers by Plaintiff. And
indeed a review of the evidence, the contract (R. 203) and
the lease agreement between the Plaintiff and the land
owner (R. 199), compels the conclusion that there are no
possessory rights granted to the advertiser. In light of
the facts, and the law which will be discussed hereinafter,
the Commission's findings evoke a nevv concept of "possession" which is novel to and a perversion of several hundred years of Anglo-Saxon property law.
The only case dealing with §59-15-2 (g) is Young Electric Sign Co. 'U. State Tax Commission. This case sheds
no light on the possession problem, however, since there
was simply no question raised there concerning possession.
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The taxpayer conceded that it had to pay a tax on at least
part of the rentals received and thus conceded that possession was transferred. In any event, that case is so
variant from the instant one on the facts that it would have
no precedential value here. The signs there were custommade identification signs installed on the premises of the
customer. The contract, as previously noted, was essentially
a sale. Thus, Young gives no assistance one way or the
other in the instant case.
There are, however, several cases from other jurisdictions, interpreting similar statutes, to which Plaintiff would
invite the Court's attention. A case closely in point is
Federal Sign & Signal Company v. Bowers, 172 Ohio St.
161, 174 NE2d 91 (1961), which dealt with the taxability
of outdoor electric sign display transactions. The statute
there imposed a sales tax on transactions in which "possession ... is or is to be transferred." Similarly, the Utah
statute refers to "a right of continuous possession" but
also refers to "such transfer of possession" - indicating
an actual, past-tense transfer. The sole question in Federal
Sign was whether the transaction involved a transfer of
possession, and the Court adopted the follmving reasoning
of the Board of Tax Appeals:
"In none of the appellant's transactions was
'title' to the signs transferred. In some of its transactions neither 'title' nor 'possession' of the signs
was tr an sferred. In the other transactions, such as
the ones here in question, the only 'possession' that
was transferred to the customer was the 'formal
possession' made necessary by virtue of the fact that
the signs were erected on real property owned or
leased by the customer rather than on property
owned or leased by appellant. However, by virtue of
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the provisions of the rental agreements, the appellant
at all times retained the 'possession' or 'custody'
necessary to perform the maintenance on these signs
required under the terms of the agreements. And
the signs themselves were not used or manipulated
in any way by the customer in the same sense that
a rented automobile, business machine, etc., might
be said to be so used."
The Court thus sustained the non-taxability of the advertising transaction. The advertising agreements in the instant case are identical to those discussed in Federal Sign
since Plaintiff retains the right and obligation to repair,
maintain, and re-locate the signs as is necessary. The only
distinction b€tween the cases is that in Federal Sign, the
signs were located on the property of the customer in
some instances - which, of course, would be a possessory
right absent from the instant transaction.
Also of pertinence is the discussion of the Supreme
Court of Colorado in Herbertson v. Cruise, 115 Colo. 274,170
P.2d 531 (1946) which involved exactly the same statutory
language as we have in §59-15-2 (g). In construing the
term "continuous possession," the Court concluded:
"It seems apparent that the most clear cut example of what the law is intended to reach is the
case of the calculating machine or multigraph machine in place of the lessee's business, and supervised by lessor under a rental agreement covering
a continuous (and usually a very considerable) period of time. This involves a more permanent type of
lease than a multifarious type, renting driver-less
cars for their varied purposes, where it might wen
happen that thirty different persons, have the rental
service of the same car. In the former case, the lessee is securing the most permanent title that the
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non-selling policy of the lessor allows him to acquire." (Emphasis ours.)
Under such reasoning and the facts of the instant case
where the client never assumes possession, control or a
proprietory interest in the property involved, continuous
possession is clearly not shown.
Of similar import is the case of Ford v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission, 285 P.2d 436 (Okla. 1955). The statute in
that instance provided that "the term 'sale' is hereby declared to mean the transfer of either the title or possession
of tangible personal property . . . " Thus, the statute requires somewhat less than ours since it mentions nothing
about "continuous" possession. The Court was called upon
to define possession, and concluded as follows:

"In Webster's New International Dictionary,
Unabridged, 2nd Edition, definitions of the word
'possession' are as follows :
'Act or state of possession .. law. Act,
fact, or condition of a person's having such
control of property that he may legally enjoy
it to the exclusion of all others having no better
right than himself.'
"The word 'possess' is stated as meaning 'to
have and hold as property, to have a just right to;
to be master of .. .'
"Under all circumstances in its connection with
tangible personal property, the otherwise unmodified word 'possession' clearly refers to him who has
actual physical control of the thing and conveys a
clear and definite meaning." (Emphasis ours.)
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Under this rationale, in all fairness, it cannot be said that
the advertising clients in the instant case have "actual
physical control of a thing."
In New York City, the sales tax statute applies to
"any transfer of title or possession or both." The New
York Court of Appeals, in construing this provision, has
held that it requires the transfer of "actual, exclusive
possession." American Locker Company v. City of New
York, 308 NY 264, 125 NE2d 421 (1955). In the same
case it was noted that "constructive possession" was insufficient.

A further note should be made concerning the word
"use" as it appears in the statute. The statute requires
"continuous possession or use," but goes on to refer to
"such transfer of possession." It would appear that "use"
was intended to be something not dissimilar to "possession"
- otherwise, of course, the Legislature would have sai<i
"such transfer of possession or use." There are relatively
few sales tax statutes which employ the word "use" and
we have found but one case discussing the term in this
context. In Howitt v. Street & Smith Publications, 276 NY
345, 12 NE 2d 435 (1938) the Court defined "use" as
follows:
"We believe that the ordinary interpretation
of the word 'use' is to assert possessory interest
in the article for some length of time... Anything
less than this, as merely the right to reproduce, is
not such a use as should make the transaction taxable as a sale of taxable personal property."
The Utah State Tax Commission has accorded "use" a
similar construction in Regulation S-32 which says, in part:
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"Tax on receipts from leases and rentals applies when the lessee has the right to use and operate the tangible personal property."
It is submited, therefore, that the word "use" adds little to
the term "possession" and that the two, in this context,
have similar meanings. The mere fact that the Legislature
used two words instead of one does not necessarily preclude giving the two terms similar meanings. (See Utah
Concrete Pr.oducts Corp. v. Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513,
125 P.2d 408 (1942) where the Court construed "used" and
"consumed" as having the same meaning even though used
together in the statute.) Certainly the term "use" contemplates control, and the right to consume, alter, vary or
manipulate the article involved, such rights being demonstrably absent here.

Both "possession" and "use" are modified in the statute by the term "continuous." In this regard, it should
be noted that Plaintiff's cilents do not gain any rights in
a given structure which are "continuous" for, in all events,
Plaintiff maintains the right to re-locate or replace any
specific structure should its advertising value be changed.
In summary, therefore, the facts in this case are such
as to make the Commission's findings in this regard clearly
unreasonable and erroneous. The Young Electric case
clearly does not support such findings since it does not
discuss "possession." Moreover, the cases from other jurisdictions dealing with analogous or identical statutes do not
in any way bolster the Commission. To the contrary, if
"possession" and/or "use" are found to exist in this case,
it would constitute a broader scope of taxation than has
been sanctioned by any Court which has considered the
problem.
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POINT III
THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN PLAINTIFF
AND ITS CUSTOMERS CONSTITUTES THE
SALE OF A NON-TAXABLE SERVICE.
Plaintiff has devoted the preceding two points of argument to the propositions that the advertising transaction
here involved is not within the intended sphere of §59-152 (g) and that, in any event, no right to possession is transferred to the customers in the transaction. Even if we
were to assume, arguendo, that this is generally the type
of transaction intended to be taxed and, further, that possession is transferred (neither of which assumption can
be made on the record here involved), Plaintiff nonetheless
submits that the transaction here involves the sale of a
non-taxable service under the previous holdings of this
Court.
To analyze this contention properly, it is necessary to
view the "totality" of the transaction between Plaintiff
and its customers. We have pointed out above that the
purpose of the transaction is not the transfer of property,
but the provision of an advertising service through outdoor
signs. The parallel between outdoor signs and other advertising media has also been discussed. The testimony demonstrates that there are numerous aspects of the transaction
which are essentially unrelated to the sign strucure itself.
Plaintiff acquires real property for sign locations, it develops artistic ideas and advertising presentations, it arranges
for the electrification and re-location of the signs, and it
repairs and maintains the signs.
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The allocation of cost involved is of key importance in
this regard. Plaintiff's comptroller testified that the sign
structure itself is not particularly significant in determining the cost to the customer. (R. 70). Matters such as the
location, length of service, maintenance and acquisition
of property were cited as being the principle criteria for
the price charged.
On a typical sign structure, the cost to the customer
would run $1600 for a four year period. (R. 71). Of this
income, approximately 15 % would be allocable to: materials ( 5 % ) , labor in painting and preparing sign ( 5 % )
and placement of the sign (5%). (R. 71 and 75). The remaining 85 % of the income is allocable to the various other
services mentioned above. (R. 75). It is undisputed that
services, per se, are untaxable,* as is the real property provided. As for the materials themselves, Plaintiff purchases
its paint, lumber, nails, etc. as an ultimate consumer and
had in the past paid a sales tax on such items at that time.
(R. 167 - notes from a member of the auditing staff).
This again points out the basic inconsistency in the Commission's position here. The Commission has had no hesitancy in collecting sales tax on the materials purchased by
Plaintiff, nor has the Commission protested when the tax
was paid for repairs under §59-15-4(e). Now, however,
it seeks to have its cake and also eat it by claiming a tax
on the entire ·proceeds from the advertising agreement apparently on the theory that the revenues would be greater
than those derived from the previous method of taxation.
Clearly, if the Commission should succeed in this question*With the exception of services in repair of property for which Plaintiff pays truces under Utah Code Ann. §59-15-4(e) (1965).
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able effort, Plaintiff would be entitled to a refund on all
taxes paid heretofore on either materials or repairs.
The net result of the present arrangement is clear. The
Commission seeks to impose a tax on 100 o/o of income notwithstanding the facts that 85% of the income is allocable
to non-taxable services (or services for which taxes had
previously been paid) and 15% is allocable to the sign itself,
with a tax already having been paid in at least 5% of
this (prior to the audit here involved). The remaining 10%
allocable to the sign is labor expense in painting and placing the sign, and it can be seriously questioned whether
this is taxable in light of the fact that it can only be
tied in with materials already taxed.
Even giving the Commission the benefit of the doubt,
the best that can be said is that 15 o/o of the total proceeds
(not otherwise taxed or otherwise exempt) are arguably
allocable to the sign structure. We submit that under the
decisions of this Court this is insufficient to bring the
transaction within the legitimate sphere of taxability.
This Court has held that where the property involved
in a transaction is merely incidental to a service rendered
in conjunction therewith, the transaction is not taxable.
See Young Electric Sign Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 4 Utah 2d 242,291P.2d900 (1955), Western Leather and Finding Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 87
Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526 (1935). In Young, the Court held
that ''repair sales" were primarily services with the materials involved being "merely incidental." Thus, the transaction was held not to be taxable. The percentage which
materials bore to the total income on such transaction was
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12% (6% cost marked up 100% for retail). The Court
discussed the matter as follows:
"Whether this is stated one way or the other,
the substance is the same, and our problem is to determine whether these were sales of materials under
the Act, or whether the furnishing of materials was
merely incidental to the furnishing of services for
which the charge to the customers was actually
made. What the customers were obtaining from the
companies were principally services and not goods.
The customers did not obtain the right of possession
or use of the sign as a result of such repair; they
were the owners of the signs before the repairs
were made. In our opinion, it would be unreasonable to find under these conditions that the materials represented a substantial portion of the outlay,
and that their use was more than merely incidental
to the services rendered. The Commission erred in
assessing taxes on "repair sales."
The evidence here brings Plaintiff to a comparable percentage - some 15 % of income being possibly allocable to
the sign structure.
The Commission will no doubt argue at this juncture
that Young Electric precludes this type of an argument
with regard to a "lease." Plaintiff would first point out
that Young is so vastly distinguishable from this case, to
the extent that it deals with leases, that it has no precedential value here whatsoever:
(a) In Young, the "lease" had all of the earmarks of a sale - indeed the sign itself was paid
for during the term of the agreement and the sign
company wrote it off as an asset.
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(b) In Young, the price was based upon the
fair cash value of the sign.
( c) In Young, the percentage of materials was
50% of the receipts.
(d) In Young, possession was transferred.
None of these facts apply to the instant transaction. Therefore, the holding of Young with respect to the rental questions therein really has no application.
In any event, Plaintiff respectfully submits that one
aspect of the Young decision would be unsound if applied
to the facts of this case. The Court seemed to say in Young
that leases, as opposed to sales, may not be analyzed to
determine whether they are in reality services, with the
property involved being incidental thereto. Relying on the
language in §59-15-2 (g) which provides that taxes should
be computed upon the "rentals paid,"* the Court noted:
"What elements enter into the charges for these
rentals can be of no materiality."
As noted above, such language is inapplicable here because
of the factual differences involved. Notwithstanding this,
Plaintiff would submit to the Court that a transaction
sought to be taxed under §59-15-2 (g) can and should be
exempted if it is essentially a service. Certainly, an outright sale incident to a service is exempt (See Young Electric v. Utah State Tax Commission, supra, and Western Leather and Finding Company v. Utah State Tax Commission,
supra) and the same treatment must be accorded to a non*It is not clear why this should give §59-15-2(g) transactions any dif-

ferent posture than actual sales, since the ~ection dealing ~th tl~e
latter provides for a tax to be computed on the purchase price paid
or charged." Utah Code Ann. §59-15-4(a).
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sale under this section. The statute, §59-15-2 (g), unequivocally contemplates that sales and possession transactions
must be treated exactly the same for tax purposes. Note
that the statute provides that the only "leases" to be taxed
are those which would be taxed if they were an "outright
sale." Therefore, to discriminate against leases in any way,
as opposed to outright sales, would be to contravene the
clear wording of the statute itself. It follows that since
sales are non-taxable, if merely incidental to a service, such
should be the case with transactions under §59-15-2 (g).
If Young were construed to hold to the contrary, it should
be overruled.
A more recent Utah case dealing with the "property""services" distinction is McKendrick v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 177 (1949), where the Court
held that the sale of artificial limbs was primarily a sale
as opposed to a service, and taxation was sustained. The
Court there said:
"The exact allocation of the cost of labor and
materials is not controlling. It is the synthesis of
both in the finished product which determines its
sales value." (9 Utah 2d 420).
Thus, where the cost of materials was equal to one-half
the cost of labor, all of which were represented in the
final product of an artificial limb, the Court sustained
taxation. As noted in the opinion, the same reasoning
would apply to a pound of ore worth but a few cents but
fashioned ultimately into hair springs for watches worth
thousands of dollars.
The instant case, however, is distinguishable from
these examples, as might be best illustrated graphically:
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Labor
Materials
Placement of sign

15 % represented in
5%}
5%
value product itself
5%

Lighting
Repair
Maintenance
Re-location
Land Acquisition
Artistic Services
Creation of Advertising Ideas

85 % not represented
in final value of
product.

The distinction is, in the words of this Court in McKendrick, in "the synthesis ... in the finished product." In
M cKendrick, in the watch spring example, and in many of
the hypotheticals which will no doubt be employed in the
Attorney General's Brief, the labor and services all enhance
the basic value of the personal property and thus are an
integral and inseparable part of it. In the instant case,
it was noted to the contrary that the value of the sign
structure is not enhanced by the various services for they
are not services applied directly to the improvement of
the property but to tangential aspects of Plaintiff's total
advertising program.
It is pertinent to refer again to Regulation S-65 wherein the Tax Commission has stated that advertising space
agreements are services rather than property and thus
should not be taxed. For some 30 years this has been
applied to billboards and we question the right of the Commission to now reverse itself in midstream, without amend-

ment to the legislation.
It is submitted, therefore, that as a matter of law,
under the undisputed facts herein, the Commission erred
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in finding that this was a lease of tangible personal property subject to taxation. To the contrary, under the Young
Electric decision, the instant transaction would constitute
the sale of a non-taxable service.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Plaintiff submits respectfully that the
decision of the Tax Commission herein should be reversed
as a matter of law for the following reasons:
(a) The advertising transactions here in question do
not come within the intent or wording of Utah Code Annotated, §59-15-2 (g). This is best illustrated by the nature
of the transaction itself, by the 30 year history of nontaxation, and by the terms of the Tax Commission's own
regulation S-65, which clearly exempts this transaction.
(b) That, in any event, the Commission erred in finding that clients of Plaintiff are granted rights to use or
possession of the signs involved. Even under the most favorable interpretation, the evidence simply does not support
such conclusions, and the Tax Commission has thus transcended its fact-finding discretion.
(c) That the transaction between Plaintiff and its clients is essentially the sale of a service and any tangible
personal property involved therein is merely incidental to
such services - thus, the transaction is untaxable.
Plaintiff submits that the action of the Commission
herein is so demonstrably unfair and discriminatory, is so
clearly a perversion of the legislative intent and the normal

35
legal concepts of taxation and property law, and is so abrupt
a reversal of the Commission's long-standing practice, that
it cannot be sanctioned by this tribunal.
Respectfully submitted,

PARSONS, BEHLE,
EV ANS & LATIMER
By Keith E. Taylor
and Gordon L. Roberts
Attorneys for Plaintiff

